In a wide-ranging interview, Chin National Front vice chair Dr Sui Khar discusses military strategy, Chin resistance infighting and Min Aung Hlaing’s miscalculations.
By LORCAN LOVETT | FRONTIER
On January 8, Frontier sat down with Dr Sui Khar, vice chairman of veteran ethnic armed group the Chin National Front. With the military regime’s grip on Chin State weakening, anti-junta forces there have split into two rival camps – the CNF-led Chinland Council and the Chin Brotherhood, a coalition of six resistance forces that emerged after the 2021 coup.
The split reflects deep divisions between Chin ethnic sub-groups who speak different, often mutually unintelligible, dialects. However, the two factions also cite disagreements over ideology and strategy. The CB questions the CNF’s commitment to revolutionary change, pointing to its participation in peace talks with the military in the years before the coup. The CNF, meanwhile, warns that the CB’s alliance with the Arakan Army threatens Chin autonomy, highlighting the AA’s control of Paletwa Township in southern Chin. The rivals also disagree on how to structure a post-revolution government and represent Chin’s diverse groups.
Sui Khar spoke to Frontier about these tensions, as well as plans to target junta forces in neighbouring Magway and Sagaing regions, and shared his assessment of junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. The interview was in English and has been edited for length and clarity.
What’s your take on the Myanmar military’s situation?
Min Aung Hlaing has made many attempts to reinforce the army – establishing the [pro-military militia] Pyusawhti, recalling the [military veteran] pensioners, enforcing conscription, forming what they call village security and anti-terrorist committees. Three of these attempts have failed. The only one that is unsure is conscription. When they send conscripts to the front line, they do not do well. When we look at Shan, Kachin, Arakan [Rakhine] and other areas, we don’t see any military victories. I think the military will withdraw from some areas and defend what they see as strategic locations.
Is that in line with predictions the military will be pushed to a strip of lowland territory along the Ayeyarwady River valley, including Nay Pyi Taw?
Yes. First, they will try to defend the state capitals. The rest of their camps [in ethnic states] they will not defend or protect much. That will happen in the first six months of 2025. Min Aung Hlaing will not easily withdraw. If you lose a state capital, it looks like you’ve lost the whole state. But when there’s a fire in Magway Region [in the Ayeyarwady valley], [the Chin capital] Hakha or [the Rakhine capital] Sittwe will be nothing for him. He will focus on [Magway].
What are your military goals for 2025?
Taking the whole of Chin State. Taking camps or posts is easy. Defending them is more difficult. Our focus is to take all the posts and camps in Chin State while looking at the adjacent areas where their reinforcements and supplies can come from.
What other areas will you fight in?
Particularly in Sagaing and Magway regions. The AA and PDFs [People’s Defence Forces] are focusing on [the junta’s] munition factories. We have to do that too. If we can paralyse all the munition factories then all the weapons, including jet fighters, won’t work for them. Without ammunition, all these things are useless. A stick or a knife would be better. To defend, the best way is to paralyse your enemy.
Magway has 24 or 25 munition factories. From what I understand, one factory doesn’t produce the whole munition but components of it. And then one factory assembles it all. If you can destroy one or two factories, then four or five factories might become useless.
You may have heard Min Aung Hlaing is preparing to defend all those factories. With what troops? Whether he can rely on conscripts is a big question. If he has to withdraw [troops] from the regular army, then what about the rest [of the junta’s defensive positions]? That’s why I think Chin State, Arakan, Kachin [will be liberated] in 2025.
Hakha presents a tough challenge for you; 700 junta soldiers are reportedly defending its main base.
Hakha is too big for 700 to defend. That’s not a big deal. The big deal is the airstrikes.
On the split in the Chin resistance, what’s the disagreement over?
It’s difficult to describe the exact factors that pushed us to polarisation. This is not the first time. Chin, in short, has never been united. When it comes to the revolution …. this is the time to unite and collaborate. But with this polarisation, people talk louder than before.
Chin comprises nine townships, but townships don’t reflect dialect groups. Institutions that represent different dialect groups have emerged, particularly religious institutions. For instance, Thantlang had only one association of Baptist churches, and all churches within Thantlang were under one umbrella. But that evolved with time. In Thantlang Township, there are four main dialect groups: Lai, Zophei, Lautu, Mara. Eventually those groups established their own religious institutions, particularly the Zophei and Lautu. They don’t speak the same dialect. It’s difficult for them to read the same Bible, to sing the same hymns. They also like to read and sing in their own dialect. In that way, Thantlang became three groups, in terms of religious institutions.
The Mara are divided among three townships: Thantlang, Matupi and Paletwa. In each, they’re a minority. They have their own dialect, Bible, hymns. They established Mara evangelical churches under one umbrella.
When the Spring Revolution came, the [post-coup] Chinland Defence Force came to me first, and I said to them why don’t you join [CNF armed wing] the Chin National Army? But they wanted to establish their own local defence forces. I said that’s good, but why don’t you come under one common name? So, they chose Chinland Defence Force. When these CDFs were established, some were based on townships and some on existing [dialect-based] institutions.
When we discuss the future composition of Chinland …. we need an institution that reflects and represents our differences. But some groups want to maintain the townships. That’s one of the core issues.
Is the Chinland Council more representative of the dialect-based groups, and the Chin Brotherhood more representative of the townships?
Yes. MPs and the CNF have also discussed it. Some MPs [elected before the coup in Chin] wanted to retain townships. The CNF said we have no problem – townships or dialect groups. But we said MPs and the CNF should not decide on the composition. Bring the issue to the people and let them decide.
The new generation of armed groups are concerned the CNF will try to represent the whole of Chin State.
The CNF is just a revolutionary organisation. The CNF will be totally abolished after the revolution. Anyone who wants to start a political party cannot use [the name] CNF. They have to start a new organisation.
The Chin Brotherhood has recently achieved military successes and conquered several towns. Would you welcome them if they offered you military assistance?
We are ready to cooperate. But we always remind them: don’t bring the AA. The AA’s hidden political agenda is to create a greater Arakan State. In Paletwa, they openly claim that now. Do they feel that’s okay? In helping to capture Matupi [town in June last year], was there any dirty game, a hidden agenda from the AA?
Do you believe the AA wants more territory in Chin State outside Paletwa?
In Kanpetlet [Township], they are trying to establish an administration that will be accountable to the AA. They [the AA] have clearly mentioned they want to do mining and can bring investors. Whenever the CNA takes a [Myanmar] army post, we never try to establish an administration. Let the people come together and establish their own.
What’s your plan to resolve the tensions with the CB and unite against the junta?
A number of third parties have tried to bring us together. The Mizoram chief minister [in neighbouring India] as well as others. We are open. We want unity.
Are you in talks with the CB?
Not yet. CMI [Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish NGO] are really expert in conflict resolution. They approach it very systematically. So far, they have talked separately to both sides. They haven’t yet arranged face-to-face talking between us. When the Mizoram chief minister asked the sides to sit together [late last year] in the same room and talk, I was busy in the [CNF headquarters] camp and didn’t attend. But when I listened, they were shaming and blaming each other – not trying to find the real differences and the solution. We may meet 1,000 times and not find a solution. So, we need third-party expert facilitation, and in that way, we can reach an agreement.
Given the towns it has captured, do you expect the CB to have significant leverage in deciding the future composition of Chin State?
What kind of cohesion do they have among each other? When you have a common enemy or competitor, you work together. When you reach a certain [stage], can you retain that level of cooperation? Has the CB come up with a credible organisational structure? If not, we have to deal with each and every [member of the CB alliance].
They’re trying to liberate [Chin]. We never look down on that. We know they have a certain level of representation. But they’re trying to build their representation with military might. That’s a very wrong idea. Because of the assistance from the AA, they can do this. What kind of game is the AA playing? In Chin society, when the AA interferes, you find the CB, and wherever the CB is, there is a divide in society. If there’s no CB, there’s no social division within Chin society.
As someone who met the generals in Nay Pyi Taw many times during the pre-coup peace process, do you think Min Aung Hlaing could fall in an internal coup?
I don’t think so. He has built up his position over 15 years. Most of the senior [military] leaders were my friends when I was in the Joint [Ceasefire] Monitoring Committee. These generals are interlinked. It would be difficult for them to remove Min Aung Hlaing. Their interests and other things are tied together. And Min Aung Hlaing promoted them and put them there. Those who Min Aung Hlaing dislikes are not in active positions. But if there was an internal coup, that would be one of the most wonderful days for Burma.
Unless his replacement is even more brutal.
I don’t know [deputy commander-in-chief] Soe Win. Kyaw Swar Lin, who was recently promoted [to chief of the general staff], is not a smart guy. You may have a policy to be cruel, but whether your army can implement that is another question. And what crueller things could they do than today, when they deploy airstrikes indiscriminately? But if they have the capacity to be crueller, then they would do that.
What are your military contacts’ thoughts on their boss, Min Aung Hlaing?
I asked them once, what is Min Aung Hlaing’s uniqueness? He always prepares in advance. For example, when he was a major-general, he already planned when he would become lieutenant-general. But he doesn’t seem to have planned what would happen if he staged a coup.
You’ve met him – what are your impressions?
I could read in his face that he underestimates all others. He thinks of himself as a great man. But when I look at him, he’s not a strong man. When he orders others, they may listen because of their respective ranks. But outside [the military], no one would listen to him. He miscalculated.
