OPINION
While the regional bloc has been criticised for its lack of effectiveness, it still has a role to play in solving Myanmar’s crisis – so long as it widens the scope of its roadmap.
By SAI LATT | FRONTIER
Less than three months after Myanmar’s military coup, leaders in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations met in Jakarta in April 2021 to discuss the crisis. Those assembled, including junta chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, agreed on a Five-Point Consensus on finding “a peaceful solution in the interests of the people”.
Ever since, however, Myanmar activists and resistance stakeholders have looked at the bloc’s efforts with scepticism, if not outright derision. A common thread is that ASEAN was ineffective during previous military regimes, and that its member states have never been proactive in supporting democratic movements in Myanmar, meaning little can be expected of it now.
Nonetheless, ASEAN is a reality everyone has to deal with. Most international actors – including China, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations – immediately supported ASEAN as the primary international mediator in the Myanmar crisis. For Myanmar stakeholders, meanwhile, ASEAN remains one of the primary international platforms. They should therefore attempt to push it in the right direction rather than dismiss it out of hand.
The Five-Point Consensus, or 5PC, calls for an immediate end to violence, the delivery of humanitarian assistance, dialogue among all parties, the appointment of a special envoy to Myanmar, and the envoy’s direct engagement with all stakeholders.
Critics of ASEAN point out that the implementation of this blueprint has been painfully slow, in part due to the complexities of Myanmar’s conflict and to ASEAN’s internal politics with its divisions, consensus-based decision-making process and non-interference doctrine. These are deep structural factors, but there are still important steps the bloc could take without a total overhaul.
For instance, the bloc’s efforts are hindered by the lack of a permanent secretariat dedicated to Myanmar. The chairmanship of ASEAN rotates between countries each year, with Malaysia taking up the mantle for 2025. This means each new chair must effectively restart efforts on Myanmar, including the appointment of a special envoy. This role should be mandated for longer than one year and not be tied to the chairmanship. Aided by a permanent secretariat with adequate resources, the envoy could significantly streamline the process and ensure consistency in the bloc’s approach.
Another area of opportunity relates to the 5PC’s call for all parties to cease violence. Despite regularly repeating this line, ASEAN has failed to weaken the war capabilities of the junta, which is the primary source of violence in Myanmar. There are reports that countries like China, India and Russia are providing the regime with weapons, drone technology, aviation fuel and other resources, and ASEAN members Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore have been accused of acting as conduits of these supplies.
ASEAN needs a creative approach to disrupt these supply chains. This issue should feature in the bloc’s and other regional security forums, and in talks between ASEAN and both source and transit countries, discreetly if necessary, and with other countries supporting the bloc’s efforts. At the very least, Myanmar, Malaysian and other Southeast Asian thinktanks should be mandated to monitor the situation and develop strategic options.
Another area where there’s room for immediate improvement is in facilitating inclusive dialogue among all stakeholders.
Indonesia and Laos, which chaired ASEAN in 2023 and last year respectively, conducted a series of meetings with Myanmar’s National Unity Government, ethnic resistance organisations, political parties, Rohingya organisations and other civil society groups, in order to gauge common positions among anti-junta groups in advance of any future talks.
However, there are still many individuals and organisations who could not participate in these talks due to a lack of travel documents, security concerns, or both. If ASEAN seeks effective mediation, it needs to facilitate travel and provide legal protections for all the actors involved.
Within ASEAN, Thailand is likely the most appropriate and convenient venue for dialogue, with most exiled Myanmar individuals and organisations based along the border between the two countries. However, many organisations and individual activists feel too unsafe to participate in in-person events in Thailand even if they’re already based there. Building trust with Myanmar stakeholders, therefore, is also partly about guaranteeing their security in the region.
Meanwhile, when it comes to ASEAN’s humanitarian assistance, the discussion has largely focused on how to reach conflict-affected people in Myanmar, particularly internally displaced persons and people living along the country’s borders. These life-saving efforts are essential, but ASEAN’s humanitarian reach has so far been limited, and much more aid is needed to support millions of suffering people in Myanmar.
At the same time, an additional dimension of Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis needs to be integrated. Millions of Myanmar people have fled to other countries in the region since the 2021 coup and they remain largely overlooked in ASEAN’s humanitarian framework. Many of these individuals live as undocumented migrants and are constantly at risk of militarised raids and deportation.
Between June and September last year, Thailand arrested almost 200,000 undocumented Myanmar nationals. Daily detentions have also been reported in Malaysia, with over 500 Myanmar nationals arrested on 22 February alone this year. Moreover, there have been reports of some being conscripted into the Myanmar military on repatriation. Even those who reside legally in other ASEAN countries face unsustainable financial burdens to maintain their legal status while having limited or no access to legal employment.
Countries understandably seek to regulate migration inflows for security and economic reasons, and managing millions of migrants is not an easy job. However, ASEAN should consider the plight of Myanmar people fleeing war, poverty and oppression. Member countries should coordinate and take their own initiatives to provide them with humanitarian protection, guaranteeing their safety, human dignity, and livelihoods in ways that also strengthen the labour market of the host country.
ASEAN has the potential to play a decisive role in resolving Myanmar’s crisis, but it must expand its framing of the 5PC and leverage its position more effectively. By, for instance, widening the scope of humanitarian assistance outside Myanmar and ensuring a truly inclusive dialogue, ASEAN can also strengthen its role as a mediator.
The most important task, though, is to stop the violence in Myanmar, especially that coming from the regime. Otherwise, Myanmar’s humanitarian crisis will only worsen as the conflict drags on, and Myanmar people witnessing and suffering the junta’s brutality will oppose any attempt at dialogue and resent any group seeking non-violent political solutions.
Most of these suggestions may seem at odds with the traditional ASEAN way of doing things, but it is important to be optimistic. Peacebuilding involves creating what does not yet exist or doing what has not been done before to break the cycle of conflict, and that requires new ways of thinking and acting.
Sai Latt is a research associate with the Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development at Chiang Mai University and the York Centre for Asian Research at York University. His social and political research focuses on peace and conflict in Myanmar through interdisciplinary perspectives, with recent work emphasising political psychology and social neuroscience.
